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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
JAPAN: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT?
KEISUKE MARK ABEt
INTRODUCTION

Since around the turn of the millennium, observers of
Japanese law and politics have been concerned about the
disconcerting signs that Japanese politicians are increasingly
nationalistic: Ex-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori described Japan
as a "divine nation centering on the Emperor"' in his speech at a
gathering of pro-Shinto lawmakers in 2000; his successor,
Junichiro Koizumi, repeatedly visited the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine throughout his term in office,2 triggering an outcry from
Asian neighbors.
The political climate in Japan has changed considerably over
Gone are the ultraconservatives'
the past several years.
proposals for constitutional revision to strengthen the power of
t Professor of Law, Seikei University; LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., University of Tokyo;
LL.M., Harvard; Member, New York Bar. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the 2010 Religious Legal Theory Conference, held on November 5,
2010. The conference was organized by Mark Movsesian and hosted by the Center
for Law and Religion at St. John's School of Law in Queens, New York. The author
wishes to thank Brett Scharffs, Matthew Harrington, Simeon Ilesanmi, Andrea Pin,
Rosemary Salomone, John Inazu, Anna Su, and other conference participants for
their valuable comments. Portions of this Article were also delivered at colloquia at
the Harvard Law School East Asian Legal Studies Program where the author spent
the 2009-2010 academic year as a visiting scholar, the University of Washington
School of Law, and the University of Gothenburg School of Global Studies. The
author is deeply grateful to Mark Ramseyer, William Alford, Morton Horwitz,
Howell Jackson, Young-Hill Liew, Lawrence Repeta, Dongsheng Zang, Dana
Raigrodski, William Herbert, Stephen Epstein, Shusaku Kitajima, and Yoshiaki
Sato for their helpful comments and encouragement. Any remaining errors are the
author's alone.
' Mori's 'Divine Nation' Remark Spurs Outrage, JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2000,
availableat http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20000517al.html.
2 Koizumi served as Prime Minister of Japan from April 2001 to September
2006. Reiji Yoshida & Kazuaki Nagata, Koizumi To Exit Political Stage,
JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, available at http//www.japantimes.co.jp/text/
nn20080926a1.html.
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the Emperor, and arrived are an unprecedented number of
tourists from around the world. * Economic partnership
agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines took effect in
2008, creating a flow of candidates for nurses and care workers
moving into Japan. Not a single day passes by without news or
comments on Asia-Pacific integration. Japan finally seems to be
opening its doors and minds to its surrounding nations.
In Kikuya v. Taniuchi,6 the Supreme Court of Japan, which
appeared so reluctant to exercise its power of judicial review in
the past, joined this tide and ruled that a Shinto shrine's use of
city-owned-land free of charge was impermissible under Article
89 of the Japanese Constitution, a provision which prohibits the
use of public resources for religious purposes. Until this decision
was made, the purpose and effect test modeled after Lemon v.
Kurtzman6 had been in place in case law, but the Court's own
narrow formulation of the doctrine had essentially prevented
Japanese taxpayers from successfully litigating separation of
church and state cases. Since the adoption of the test in 1977,
there was only one judgment invalidating governmental action in
this field.
In applying the much more flexible "totality of the
circumstances" analysis, the majority in Kikuya demonstrated its
awareness of the highly political context of the case and of its
possible international implications. The motivation for judicial
activism seems clear: the perception of the need for increased
protection of fundamental constitutional values and for
eradication of pre-modern customs in order to "occupy an honored

I According to the data compiled by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism, based on the Ministry of Justice's documents, the number
of international visitors to Japan was 8.35 million in 2008, hitting a record high.
See Number of Inbound and Outbound Travelers, JAPAN TOURISM AGENCY,
http://www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/en/siryou/toukeilinout.html (last updated Apr. 12,
2010).
" See More Nurses, Caregivers Arrive from Indonesia Under Agreement, JAPAN
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, available at http://searchjapantimes.cojp/cgi-bin/
nn20100808a5.html.
6 Saik6 Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 1 (Japan).
6

403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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place in an international society striving for ... the banishment
of. . . oppression and intolerance"7 as outlined in the Preamble to
the Constitution of Japan.
This Article first introduces the Japanese constitutional
scheme as it relates to separation of church and state and
explains the case law governing this area. It then compares this
constitutional scheme with the new approach taken in Kikuya.
Following the discussion about the Japanese Supreme Court's
recent willingness to break with precedent in high-profile cases
involving constitutional issues, it concludes with a suggestion
that the development is best understood as an example of the
judiciary's self-conscious efforts to rectify unconstitutional
governmental practice in light of the progress of globalization.
Indicating that the Japanese Supreme Court is prepared to fulfill
its mandate to the fullest extent, Kikuya has signaled a new era
for law and religion in Japan, whose constitution is a sister to the
United States Constitution but whose people's religious
consciousness stands in sharp contrast with that in the United
States.8
I.

THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE

From a perspective of comparative law, Japan is a "mixed
jurisdiction" in the sense that its legal system is built upon dual
foundations of common-law and civil-law materials.9 While many
of the other so-called mixed jurisdictions are typically former
French or Dutch colonies that were later occupied or acquired by
Britain or the United States-which is the case in places like
Louisiana, Quebec, South Africa, and Sri Lanka--Japan does not
share such history. It follows the general pattern usually found
I NIHoNKoKu KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl. (Japan) (GOVT PRINTING
BUREAU trans.), availableat http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html.
I Of the 30% of Japanese adults who claimed to have a religion, 75% considered
themselves Buddhists, 19% Shintoists, and 12% Christians, according to a recent
survey. See Audrey Barrick, More People Claim Christian Faith in Japan,
CHRISTIAN POST (Mar. 19, 2006, 10:24 AM), http://www.christianpost.com/
news/more-people-claim-christian-faith-in-japan-1549/.
The teenage population
revealed somewhat different statistics; "[of the 20 percent who professed to have a
religion, 60 percent called themselves Buddhists, 36 percent Christians and
Shintoists." Id.
9 Vernon Valentine Palmer, Introduction to the Mixed Jurisdictions,in MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 3, 7-8 (Vernon Valentine
Palmer ed., 2001).
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in mixed legal systems, however, in that its private law has been
principally rooted in the civil law tradition, whereas its public
law is primarily Anglo-American. 10 This is because Japan
created its modern legal system following the continental
European model in the nineteenth century, but its constitution
was completely revised under the American influence in 1946.
This means that the system of judicial review was introduced
to Japan after the Second World War. It also means that,
realistically, the protection of individual rights and liberties
started in the latter half of the 1940s, because the previous
Japanese constitution was modeled after the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Prussia of 1850, which was highly autocratic in
nature. Under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, adopted
in 1889 and often referred to as the Meiji Constitution," all the
powers were in the hands of the Emperor, 2 checks and balances
among governmental branches were virtually nonexistent, and
reservations were attached to the guarantee of rights and
liberties.1 3 According to its text, Japanese "subjects" enjoyed the
freedom of religion, but only "within limits not prejudicial to
peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as
subjects."14

10

See id. at 8-10.

" The Meiji Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor Meiji on February
11, 1889. It took effect on November 29, 1890, and continued to be in force until it
was superseded by the Constitution of Japan on May 3, 1947. See infra note 12.
12 See NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], ch. 1 (Japan) (GOV'T
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http//www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etd
cOl.html; DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 4 (Japan)
(Ito Miyoji trans.), available at http-//www.ndl.go.jp/constitutione/etc/cO2.html ("The
Emperor is the head of the Empire. . . ."); id. art. 5 ("The Emperor exercises the
legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet."); id. art. 6 ("The Emperor
gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed."); id. art.
57, para. 1 ("The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to
law, in the name of the Emperor.").
" See, e.g., DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 22
(Japan) (Ito Miyoji trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/
c02.html ("Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits of the law."); id. art. 29 ("Japanese subjects shall, within the
limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and
associations.").
14 Id. art. 28.
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Their duties as subjects turned out to be quite onerous:
Shintoism, whose highest authority is the Emperor,15 was made a
de facto national religion,'" Shinto shrines all over the country
were granted a privileged status, and they became a mechanism
of conveying the will of the Emperor to his subjects. Selfless
devotion to the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami, the mythical
ancestor of the Imperial family, was demanded. A special statute
was passed in the Imperial Diet in 1906 to let the national
treasury fund the operating expenses of more than two hundred
Shinto shrines of major importance,'" and an Imperial edict
issued that same year directed all the prefectures, cities, towns,
and villages in Japan to make seasonal offerings to Shinto
shrines in their domain.' 8 The government did this by explaining
that Shintoism was not a religion,' 9 but a Japanese tradition or
convention that every person should abide by.
All this changed when the German-style Meiji Constitution
was replaced by the present constitution, pursuant to the
Potsdam Declaration and subsequent suggestions made by
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (the "SCAP"). The Constitution of Japan, which
was proclaimed in 1946 and came into effect in 1947, provides
that the Supreme Court has the power to determine the
constitutionality of any statute or governmental action2 0 and that
law or governmental action that is contrary to the Constitution
shall have no legal force or validity.2 1 It has an extensive list of
individual rights and liberties as well,2 2 thanks to the meticulous
" Shintoism is the traditional Japanese religion. MARILYN REID, MYTHICAL
STAR SIGNs 25 (2005). Worshipping the Emperor as a descendant of the sun goddess
is still an important part of its practice today. Id.
16 See Eiichiro Takahata, Religious Accommodation in Japan, 2007 BYU L. REV.
729, 736.
17 Law No. 24 of 1906 (Japan).
* Imperial Edict No. 96 of 1906 (Japan).
* See Takahata, supra note 16, at 736 n.64. ("Shinto priests were treated as
state officials and shrines as public institutions. In schools, students were strongly
encouraged to visit a shrine, even if it was against the students' beliefs. The
government asserted that since Shinto was not a religion, these actions did not
contradict the Constitution.").
20 See NIHoNKoKu KENPO [KENPO]
[CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan) (GOV'T
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etd
cOl.html.
21 See id. art. 98.
22 See id. art. 10-40 (Chapter III of the Constitution of
Japan, entitled "Rights
and Duties of the People," is the Japanese Bill of Rights). There are very few
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and passionate efforts of U.S. legal advisors working under the
SCAP, including Courtney Whitney and Milo E. Rowell. The
spirit of the rule of law and the essence of Marbury v. Madison23
are explicitly embodied into the text of the Constitution, as
well as other related political ideals such as representative
democracy 24 and separation of powers. 25
Mindful of the disastrous consequences of commingling
politics with religion before and during the war, the present
Constitution pays special attention to the issue of separation of
church and state.2 6 Paragraph 1 of Article 20 states the basic
principle that no religious organization shall receive any
privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority,
while the following paragraph specifies that no person shall be
compelled to take part in any "religious act, celebration, rite or
practice." 27 Paragraph 3 of Article 20 draws a corollary
therefrom and sets a limit on governmental conduct: "The State
and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other
religious activity."2 8 Finally, Article 89 elaborates the point as it
relates to finance by providing that "[nio public money or other
property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or
maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any
charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the
control of public authority."2

provisions concerning duties. But see id. art. 26, para. 2 ("All people shall be
obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education
as provided for by law."); id. art. 30 ("The people shall be liable to taxation as
provided by law.").
23 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
24 See NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPOI [CONSTITUTION], art. 43, para. 1 (Japan)
(Gov'T PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at httpJ/www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/
e/etc/c0l.html ("Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all
the people.").
21 See id. art. 41 ("The Diet shall be the . .. sole law-making organ of the
State."); id. art. 65 ("Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet."); id. art. 76
para. 1 ("The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as are established by law.").
26 The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers had issued a directive
instructing the Japanese government to stop providing special support and
supervision to Shintoism in 1945. See GHQ Directive of December 15, 1945 (Japan).
27 NIH)NKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20, para. 1 (Japan) (GOV'T
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/cOl.
html.
28 Id. art. 20, para. 3.
2 Id. art. 89.
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The leading case in this area is Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 0 in
which the Japanese Supreme Court faced the question of
whether the municipal government could remunerate Shinto
priests for performing a ritual with some religious significance.
The dispute started when the City of Tsu held a groundbreaking
ceremony called jichinsai on the occasion of constructing a city
gymnasium. Originally a Shinto rite intended to calm the god of
the earth, jichinsai is arguably a custom firmly established in
most parts of Japan. Many landowners, regardless of their
religious affiliation, have this ceremony conducted whenever
construction begins on their property, perhaps because
carpenters are often reluctant to set to work without a proper
jichinsai, for fear that it might anger the god of the earth and
lead to an accident on site."
A communist member of the city council sued the mayor and
sought the return of the priests' honoraria and other expenses for
the ritual, arguing that such expenditure out of public funds was
unlawful. The Japanese Supreme Court dismissed the suit, on
the grounds that jichinsai was mostly secular and did not violate
the Constitution. The Court emphasized at the outset that a
total separation of religion and the State was almost impossible,
and that an attempt to realize it would verge on the absurd,
calling into question the constitutionality of government
subsidies for all private schools including religiously affiliated
schools, for example.
Accordingly, the Court interpreted
Paragraph 3 of Article 20 as prohibiting not all governmental
contact with religion, but only that which exceeded reasonable
limits.

o Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 69, 31, SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHOI 533, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/

english/judgments/text/1977.7.13-1971.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..69.html (Japan).
31 Carpentering has been a trade with a strong connection with Shintoism in
Japan. The Ise Grand Shrine, the apex of all the shrines, for example, owns two
adjoining sites of identical size and rebuilds its buildings every twenty years; serving
on this project is generally considered to be a high honor for a carpenter.
See Shikinen Sengu Ceremony in Ise Jingu, JINGO, http://www.isejingu.or.jp/english/
sikinen/sikinen.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). At present, the buildings to be used
beginning in 2013 are being built. See id. The current construction work started in
2006, following the Emperor's permission in 2004 and a variety of rituals in 2005.
See id. The Ise Grand Shrine is located in Mie Prefecture, the same prefecture that
the City of Tsu belongs to. See id.
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The majority, consisting of ten Justices out of fifteen, went
on to formulate a test to determine whether the contact was
within reasonable limits.
Under Kakunaga, governmental
conduct falls under Paragraph 3 of Article 20 only when it has
some religious meaning as its purpose and its effect is to
"promote, subsidize, or, conversely, to interfere with, or oppose
religion." 3 2 The Court concluded that the groundbreaking
ceremony was not a religious activity prohibited by Paragraph 3
of Article 20, because its purpose was to "ensure a stable
foundation and safe construction" 33 and it could not possibly have
the effect of "promoting or encouraging Shinto or of oppressing or
interfering with other religions."34 The Justices explained that it
was unlikely that a secularized ritual such as jichinsai would
"raise the religious consciousness of those attending or of people
in general or lead in any way to the encouragement or promotion
of Shinto.""

Kakunaga was decided in 1977.6 It has been pointed out
that there are echoes of Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 1971 decision,
in its purpose and effect test. 37 Despite the similarity in
appearance, however, the Kakunaga test is much harder to meet,
as there is no entanglement prong and a litigant must
demonstrate that the governmental conduct in question has a
religious purpose and an effect of promoting or opposing religion
in order to prevail. The government enjoys the benefit of the
presumption of constitutionality under Kakunaga.
32CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES,
CODES,
AND COMMENTARY 228 (Frank K. Upham trans., 2006).
* Id. at 230.
34

Id.

Id. Note that, under the majority's view, how the general public perceives the
governmental conduct in question weighs heavily in the determination of its
constitutionality. Kakunaga is thus said to have "allowed state support of religious
institutions that were specifically targeted by the postwar Constitution" in effect, for
"the religious institutions most likely to get state support are Shinto institutions
because of the ease with which Shinto ceremonies can be considered cultural events
as opposed to religious events." Keiko Yamagishi, Freedom of Religion, Religious
Political Participation,and Separation of Religion and State: Legal Considerations
from Japan,2008 BYU L. REV. 919, 932-33.
36 Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 69, 31, SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO] 533, available at http://www.courts.go.
jp/english/judgments/textl977.7.13-1971.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..69.html (Japan).
3 For an analysis of the "Japanization" of the purpose and effect test, see
Hidenori Tomatsu, The Reception in Japan of the American Law and Its
Transformation in the Fifty Years Since the End of World War II: Constitutional
Law, 26 LAW IN JAPAN 14, 17-18 (2000).
35
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Applying this standard, the Japanese Supreme Court
subsequently rejected most of the petitions asking it to declare
governmental action inconsistent with Paragraph 3 of Article 20.
In Japan v. Nakaya,3 8 a Christian wife of a deceased member of
the Ground Self-Defense Force ("SDF") sought damages for his
enshrinement in a Shinto shrine without her consent. The Court
succinctly rejected her claim, stating that the government's
secretarial support for the ex-servicemen's association in its
application for the enshrinement of the plaintiffs husband was
for the purpose of "rais[ing] the social status and morale of SDF
members"" and "would not be considered by the general public as
having the effect of the State drawing attention to a particular
religion, or sponsoring, promoting or encouraging a specific
religion or suppressing or interfering with a religion." 40
Likewise, a city's reconstruction of a monument to honor the
memory of those who were killed in the war was found to be
secular in purpose and neutral in its effect; 4 1 So was another
city's granting permission for a group of residents' erection of a
stone statue of a Buddhist saint on a parcel of land owned by the
city without paying any rental or other consideration. 42

" Saike Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1,
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 277 (Japan).
39 MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 32, at 234.

1988, 42 SAIKO SABANSHO MINA

40 Id. Justice Masami Ito, who was a comparative law professor at the
University of Tokyo before joining the bench and was a prolific writer in the area of
comparative constitutional law, wrote a passionate dissent, pointing out that the
Court must look into the matter from the viewpoint of a minority member when
deciding a constitutional case, and that religious minorities in Japan are often hurt
because the society is indifferent to religion in general. He was the lone dissenter,
however; the remaining fourteen Justices were all of the opinion that the suit should
be dismissed.
41 See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 16, 1993, 1987 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 148, 47
SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHU] 1687, available at http://www.courts.
gojp/english/judgments/text/1993.2.16-1987-Gyo-Tsu-.No.148.html (Japan).
42 See 1441 HANREI JIHO 57 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 16, 1992), available at http://
www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdjs-20100319131444073196.pdf (Japan). This case does
not appear to be good law any longer in view of Kikuya v. Taniuchi, discussed in
Part II of this article. See infra Part II.

456

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:447

The only exception to this trend came in 1997. In Anzai v.
Shiraishi,4 3 the Japanese Supreme Court held that it was a
violation of Paragraph 3 of Article 20 for a prefectural governor
to use taxpayers' money for offerings to Shinto shrines. The
majority, composed of ten Justices, applied the Kakunaga test
and found the donation unconstitutional; three Justices
concurred in the result, and the remaining two dissented.
Concurring opinions in Anzai are illuminating. Justice Itsuo
Sonobe I -who was an administrative law professor before
coming to the Court-suggested that he would apply Article 89,
instead of Paragraph 3 of Article 20, and find the offerings
automatically invalid; he questioned the propriety of some of the
earlier decisions using the Kakunaga test inadvertently in the
context of Article 89. The other two Justices maintained that
Kakunaga had been wrong from the beginning in that it allowed
government involvement in religion unless proven to be
excessive. Indeed, the correct interpretation of Paragraph 3 of
Article 20 should be that such involvement is prohibited across
the board unless justified by exceptional circumstances.
Although a decision invalidating governmental action under a
deferential standard of review-particularly when accompanied
with forceful concurring opinions-may often be a signal that the
Court is willing to adopt a stricter test in the future, the exact
scope of Anzai was not clear, partly because of its timing: nine
Justices out of thirteen who considered the governor's action
unconstitutional were those appointed by either the short-lived
1993 coalition government or the following Socialist-led coalition

' Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 16, 1993, 1987 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 148, 47 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO] 1687, 51 MINSHU 1673 (Sup. Ct,. Apr. 2,
1997), available at http://www.courts.gojp/english/judgments/text/1997.04.02-1992Gyo-Tsu-No.156.html (Japan). The plaintiffs in this case were a group of residents of
Ehime Prefecture, whose governor was Haruki Shiraishi, the defendant. See id. The
organizational head of the plaintiffs was Kenji Anzai, a Buddhist monk. See id.
" Justice Sonobe was appointed to fill the vacancy on the Court created by the
retirement of Justice Ito in 1989.
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government.4 5 Prior to Anzai, the vast majority of Justices had
been appointed by the dominant Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP"), the party with the greatest affinity for Shintoism.
II. KIKUYA V. TANIUCHI: A TURNING POINT
Kikuya v. Taniuchi, 6 decided January 2010, may be an

extension of the suggestions of the concurring Justices in Anzai.
The essential facts are undisputed. The City of Sunagawa,
located in Hokkaido, the northernmost major island of Japan,
has a community center on its land. Being otherwise perfectly
ordinary, it has a few peculiar features: in front of the onestoried building is a torii, a double T-shaped stone structure
representing a gateway to a Shinto shrine, approximately fifteen
feet in width and twelve feet in height. It is a fixture generally
believed to demarcate the sacred realm from the secular. There
is a plaque attached to the torii, which reads "Sunagawa
Sorachibuto Shrine." The community center behind the torii gate
has two separate entrances, one that is for everyday use and the
other for Shinto worshippers who come to pray on New Year's
Day and during the Spring and Autumn Festivals, when Shinto
priests are dispatched from a nearby shrine. Local Shinto
believers regularly take care of the maintenance and cleaning of
the part of the building used as a shrine, but they have never
made any payment to the city for the use of its property.
A Christian resident sued the mayor in court, asking for a
declaratory judgment that it was illegal for the mayor not
to request the neighborhood association in charge of the
management of the community center to remove the torii and all
other facilities and equipment related to Shintoism. The District
Court applied the Kakunaga test, found that granting permission
to use the premises to a religious group amounted to a religious
activity proscribed under Paragraph 3 of Article 20, and
4 The Liberal Democratic Party, which ran the Japanese government for most
of the period between 1955 and 2009, temporarily lost power to the non-LDP
coalition of eight parties in 1993. Less than eleven months later, it made a comeback
by driving a wedge into the coalition and allying itself with the Socialists and
another smaller political group, the Sakigake, but the newly-formed government was
led by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the leader of the Socialist Party, from
1994 to 1996.
46
Saike Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO] 1, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/

20100120164304.pdf (Japan).
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concluded that the mayor must demand of the neighborhood
association that the city property be kept free of religious objects
or symbols. The High Court affirmed. The Japanese Supreme
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, but it made it clear
that the city's inaction was constitutionally impermissible. The
only reason it reversed the judgment below was because it opinedthat the problem might well be solved by transferring the title of
the property to the neighborhood association-an aggregate of
private citizens-or charging them a reasonable rent.47
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not discuss Paragraph
3 of Article 20 at all. Instead, it took a new approach to the issue
and applied Article 89. Under the majority's view, when the
State or a municipality lets a religious institution make use of
public property free of charge, its constitutionality under Article
89 is determined by looking to all the circumstances-including
the nature of the religious institution in question, how its use of
public property started, what kind of benefits are provided, and
how the general public views the situation. The Court made only
a passing reference to its precedent: It simply stated that its
interpretation of Article 89 is consistent with both Kakunaga.and
Anzai.

After examining the totality of the circumstances, the
majority concluded that the city's inaction was unconstitutional
under Article 89. It found that the religious institution in
question was nothing but a Shinto shrine, and that the shrine
was continuously receiving benefits not enjoyed by others for an
extended period of time. Although the way the use of public
property had started was not completely out of reason, for a
substantial portion of the land had been donated to the city by
one of its residents-supposedly a Shinto believer-with the
understanding that the shrine could continue to operate there,
the general public would inevitably view the state of affairs as
the city giving special benefits and support to Shintoism.4 8 The
Court therefore held that the entanglement between the city and
the shrine or Shintoism exceeded reasonable limits and was in
See id.
I The resident invited the shrine, which needed space to rebuild its building, to
move onto his land rent-free around 1948, but thereafter offered the premises gratis
to the then Town of Sunagawa to avoid the continued burden of property tax. See id.
The town council voted to accept his proposal and acquired the title of the land in
1953. See id.
4
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contravention of Article 89. Additionally, it suggested that the
status quo might also be seen as a violation of Paragraph 1 of
Article 20, which forbids privileges for religious organizations.
The case was remanded to the Sapporo High Court for
reconsideration of remedies, because the eight Justice majority
did not agree with the lower court's ruling that the mayor must
urge the neighborhood association to remove all things religious
from the city property. The city could, for example, ameliorate
the constitutional problem by collecting a rent commensurate
with the market rate.
Four Justices wrote a joint opinion concurring in the result
only, and maintaining that the Sapporo High Court's findings of
facts--on which the majority based its judgment-were too
insufficient and one-sided to support the Court's conclusion as to
the constitutionality of the shrine's presence on municipal land,
thereby calling for a remand to examine the evidence more
thoroughly and consider "all the circumstances" in the true sense
of the word.4 9 Two Justices dissented, but one of them was of the
opinion that he would uphold the judgment below in its entirety,
without remanding the case. Only one Justice said that he would
rather declare it in fact constitutional for the city to let Shinto
believers continue to use its property free of charge.50
Bypassing Kakunaga by relying on Article 89, Kikuya
effectively changed the rules of the game for lawsuits aimed at
eliminating excessive government involvement with religion.
The Japanese Supreme Court has established a new framework
for reviewing the constitutionality of governmental action in this
area, under which it can more freely fine-tune the thresholds
The Justices'
according to individual factual backgrounds.
admonition to the mayor regarding his loose control and poor
management of public resources has sent a shock wave from
Hokkaido to Okinawa, as it is estimated that there are thousands
of shrines that "continue to enjoy privileged, and so probably

" Japanese intermediate appellate courts are empowered to make additional
findings of facts as they see fit in civil and administrative cases. See MINJI SOSHOHO
[MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 297 (Japan); Gyosei Jiken Sosho Ho
[Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 7. ("Any matters
concerning administrative case litigation which are not provided for in this Act shall
be governed by the provisions on civil actions.").
5o Only fourteen Justices participated in this case, because there was an unfilled
vacancy caused by the sudden death of one Justice.
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unconstitutional, access to municipal land"" in the country. It is
also notable that many of the Court's earlier decisions concerning
Paragraph 3 of Article 20 appear to be susceptible to overruling if
they are to be reconsidered in light of Kikuya, for many of them
involve the payment of money, the transfer of property, or the
provision of services or other benefits. The discovery of Article
89's hidden potential may have a significant impact upon the
actual day-to-day practice of local governments across Japan, and
ultimately upon how Japan is perceived by outsiders living
within its borders, as well as by the rest of the world-especially
by neighboring Asian nations where Shintoism is still regarded
as a symbol of militarism.
One vexing question remains: What about the national
government's entanglement with religion?
Here lies a
fundamental contradiction. More than sixty years after the
adoption of the United-States-inspired constitution, Japanese
litigants are suffering from the remnants of the past, in the form
of an inflexible understanding of administrative law and
procedure imported from pre-war Germany, followed faithfully by
fossilized judges and doctrinaires. The theory, still prevalent in
practice, goes like this: as for the unlawful use of public funds by
a prefecture or a municipality, any resident thereof can challenge
it in court, since there is a provision in the Local Autonomy Law
explicitly authorizing a citizen to bring an action.5 2 In contrast,
nowhere in the Japanese Gazette is there a statute recognizing
the rights of taxpayers to sue the national government for such a
wrong, unless associated with some other, more individualized
harm for which redress is available.
As a result, Japanese taxpayers today find themselves in an
anomalous position, where, with respect to exactly the same kind
of governmental action, they must demonstrate that their own
rights are infringed upon if they are to sue the State, whereas no
such proof is necessary if the defendant is a local government.
The best example of the preposterousness of this approach can be
seen in a 1995 decision of the Osaka High Court, which rejected a
claim for a declaratory judgment that the expenditure of over 2.5
billion yen out of public coffers for daijosai,the first major Shinto
ceremony conducted by the Emperor after his enthronement, was
5 John Breen, "Conventional Wisdom" and the Politics of Shinto in Postwar
Japan,4 POL. & RELIGION 68, 70 (2010).
" See Chiho Jichi Ho [Local Autonomy Law], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 242-2.
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unconstitutional.5 3 In an ironical dictum, the three judges
unanimously pointed out that "it is evident that daijosai has a
character as a Shinto ritual,"5 4 and that "there remains some
doubt"" as to whether the disbursement would be constitutional
if it were to be examined under Kakunaga. That did not affect
the outcome of the case, however, for the governmental action in
question did not impose material obligations or burdens on the
plaintiffs, according to the Osaka High Court. 6
Yet, it is also true that such incongruous decisions have
brought to light the inadequacy of mechanical and formalistic
jurisprudence. Citing Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election
Commission,7 in which the Supreme Court held despite the lack
of a statutory basis enabling the plaintiff to file a suit that
vote dilution through malapportionment violated the Equality
Clause,55 Hidenori Tomatsu-the foremost authority on Japanese
constitutional law litigation-emphasizes that lawsuits to
enforce the separation of church and state should be entertained
against the national government, as well as the local ones, in
order to promote constitutional values.5 9 He also proposes that a
new statute should be enacted to specify the procedures for
seeking damages in tort or contract against the State, 6
considering that such an action is often the only practicable
measure a plaintiff can take when trying to implement a
constitutional norm against the national government's
" See 46 GYosHU 250 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 9, 1995), available at http://www.
courts.gojp/hanrei/pdf/138ECD21CF88967049256D4100OA7924.pdf.
5 Id. (author's translation).
6 Id. (author's translation).
56 The plaintiffs in this case presented a variety of novel claims, probably the
most central of which was that they, either as taxpayers or as members of the
electorate, had been indirectly compelled to attend the ritual, whose expenses had
been paid from public funds and whose attendees had included the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the House of Councillors. See id.
5
Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 223, available at http://www.courts.gojp/hanreilpdfljs
20100319121425398065.pdf (Japan).
6 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1 (Japan) (GOv'T
trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/
PRINTING BUREAU
e/etc/c01.html. Following in the footsteps of its American counterpart Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court of Japan overruled its earlier precedent,
under which the matter had been left to the discretion and prudence of the
legislature, and struck down the relevant provisions of the Public Offices Election
Law.
59 See HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPO SOSHO 143 (2008).
60 See id. at 150.
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unlawfulness. The plaintiffs in the daijosai case, for example,
claimed compensation for emotional pain and suffering caused by
the government-sponsored Shinto ceremony, which they did not
approve of, but the Osaka High Court was hard pressed to find a
statutory ground for awarding damages to them.
If the Japanese Supreme Court is willing to stretch its
judicial creativity a little further, it may be possible to elaborate
upon Kikuya and make a fresh observation on the issue of
politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine dedicated to
those who died in war including executed Class A war criminals,
which have been a source of tension between Japan and its
neighbors since at least the 1980s. 1 Because of the lack of
alternatives, litigants in the past challenged the constitutionality
of prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine via the
National Compensation Law or the Civil Code, 63 seeking
damages for emotional distress caused by the infringement upon
their religious freedom,6 4 the right to privacy,. or the right to live
No court has ever recognized an invasion of such
in peace.
rights in this context. This has made the question of whether the
Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is compatible with
the Constitution totally irrelevant and not worth answering,
although some lower courts have gone ahead and found it
unconstitutional in dicta.6 ' Every single claim for damages has
been denied, as no cognizable interest exists in the first place in
the eyes of the law.
" Yasukuni has been the "single most important issue in post war state-religion
relations" in Japan. See Breen, supra note 51, at 71. The Yasukuni Shrine occupies a
special place in the hierarchy of Shinto shrines in that it is above all an imperial
shrine. "Its war dead died for imperial Japan; its rituals are graced by the presence
of imperial emissaries. Those rituals celebrate the imperial virtues the dead
exhibited in their dying: patriotism and loyalty and self-sacrifice." Id. at 79.
62 Kokka Baisho Ho [National Compensation Law], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1,
para. 1.
63 MINPO [MINPO] [CIv. C.] art. 709 (Japan).
6 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 43, para. 1 (Japan) (GOV'T
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.gojp/constitutionle/etc/
cOl.html.
6 Id. art. 13.
* Id. pmbl.
67 E.g., 52 SHOGETSU 2979 (Osaka High Ct. Sept. 30, 2005).
' This long-held view, unanimously espoused by those lower courts considering
the controversy, has been reinforced by a 2006 decision of the Supreme Court, which
has made it clear that there is no right to seek compensation for emotional distress
caused by another person's visit to a particular shrine. See 1940 HANREI JIHO 122
(Sup. Ct., June 23, 2006).
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It would be extremely unnatural, however, if Article 89 could
not be applied to the national government without proof of
infringement on individual rights.
Now that the obscure
provision in the chapter on finance has turned out to be
remarkably effective as a restraint upon the local government's
sloppy property management, the paradox of the traditional
formalistic approach is visible to everyone. A politician capable
of attracting domestic and international attention is most
probably accompanied by security guards, who are public
servants, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. He or she
typically uses an official vehicle wherever he or she may go. ExPrime Minister Koizumi used to justify his visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine by highlighting that worshipping the souls of the war
dead was not part of his official duty as the Prime Minister,69 but
the use of public resources for personal religious purposes would
be highly questionable if it were to be examined from the angle of
Article 89, or in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Whatever the purpose of the Prime Minister's visit may be, the
general public is likely to consider it as the government giving
special support to Shintoism associated with ancestor worship.
Seemingly a case about a community center in the distant
countryside at first glance, Kikuya may be an encrypted message
from the judiciary to nostalgic politicians in Tokyo.70
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS:
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION FOR JAPANESE LAW

Article 81 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the
Japanese Supreme Court is "the court of last resort with power to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or
official act."7 ' As a matter of legal structure, it has therefore
been possible, and in fact obligatory, for the Japanese judiciary to
step in to invalidate law or governmental action infringing upon
individual rights and liberties and enforce constitutional norms
for the past sixty-plus years. The Court, however, was not active
in fulfilling its mission up until recently. Its indecisiveness was
noted by outside observers. Lawrence Friedman points out that
69 See, e.g., Reiji Yoshida, Koizumi Visits Yasukuni Shrine, JAPAN TIMES, Oct.
18, 2005.
70 See Breen, supra note 51, at 79.
7n

NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION],

art. 81 (Japan) (GOV'T

PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http-//www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/ete/c
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the Supreme Court of Japan has been "rather reluctant to
exercise the power" 7 2 of judicial review, very much unlike the
German constitutional court, which was also created when
Americans restructured the government after the Second World
War;73 Tom Ginsburg too notices that the Court "appears to
follow a path of great restraint."7 4 Ginsburg describes what the
Court exercises as "low-equilibrium judicial review." Since the
Court is concerned about its own ability to secure compliance
from other bodies, it does not often challenge politically powerful
actors, with the result that it is "rarely called upon to adjudicate
truly important disputes.""
To put things into perspective, even in the United States, the
Supreme Court seldom exercised the power of judicial review
before the Civil War, although Marbury itself was decided in
1803. The first few successful cases involving freedom of speech
or freedom of the press came still later, specifically in the 1920s
and 1930s; 77 and as for the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Court seems
to have started vindicating them in the 1940s. 8 Even in the
homeland of judicial review, it took more than a century before
the judiciary embarked on actively enforcing rights and liberties
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
This was perhaps because, first, before the beginning of the
twentieth century, judges deciding constitutional claims did not
have enough accumulation of case law or constitutional theories
to rely on, as there had been few decisions about individual
rights and liberties, and second, on the part of the society as well,
the idea of bringing a lawsuit to defend one's constitutional
rights was not so common among the general public. The model
for constitutional decision-making was apparently lacking.
Major civil rights organizations such as the National Association

72

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 68 (1999).

7

See id.

Tom GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 98 (2003).
7

Id. at 99.
Id. at 74.
7 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927).
7 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
71

76

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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for the Advancement of Colored People 9 and the American Civil
Liberties Union 0 started their activities in the first half of the
twentieth century. In the case of Japan, the circumstances
similar to those of the United States before the era of civil rights
still exist today.
It is then little wonder that the Supreme Court of Japan has
not utilized its power of judicial review frequently so far. The
situation has been quite extreme. The Appendix to this Article
below shows the number of its decisions that struck down
statutory provisions or governmental actions on constitutional
grounds. Even taking into consideration Japan's low litigation
rates per capita and the disproportionately small number of
lawyers, these figures seem too low. The Court has held
statutory provisions unconstitutional only eight times in its
entire history.
Yet a closer look reveals that major qualitative changes are
taking place. The Supreme Court seems to have gotten more
attentive to its mission and "less timid over time."8 Most
importantly, there has been a shift in the areas the Court focuses
its attention on.
Although there are a number of decisions that invalidated
governmental actions on constitutional grounds from the 1940s
to the 1970s, they are mostly those that arose from idiosyncratic
fact patterns. In one case, the court of first instance forfeited the
vessel and cargo used for smuggling without providing any notice
whatsoever to the owner, who had nothing to do with the
" The NAACP was founded in 1909; the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, the civil and human rights law firm, was established in 1940. See NAACP v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 132, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
'o The ACLU, the largest public interest law firm in the United States,
according to its website, was founded in 1920. See ACLU History, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.orglaclu-history (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
8
See Bruce E. Aronson, The Braue New World of Lawyers in Japan:
Proceedings of a Panel Discussion on the Growth of Corporate Law Firms and the
Role of Lawyers in Japan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 45, 47-49 (2007) ("[F]or much of
the postwar era the reality of legal practice in Japan seemed consistent with the
image of a society which neither depended on nor highly valued lawyers."). As a
result of the recent legal reform, the number of lawyers in Japan is expected to
exceed 30,000 soon. This number is still less than that of newly qualified attorneys
per year in the United States but was enough to cause political turmoil: the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations is requesting the government to suspend the ongoing
reform. See Number of Lawyers in Japan To Top 30,000 Soon, JAPAN TODAY (on file
with author).
82 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 72.
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defendant;3 in another case, the criminal trial was discontinued
for more than fifteen years for unknown reasons.' Similarly,
decisions that invalidated statutory provisions in the 1970s also
include one eccentric case, in which a provision in the Criminal
Code mandating capital punishment or lifetime imprisonment for
patricide, irrespective of individual circumstances, was held to
be unconstitutional.85 These cases are so outlandish that it
is obvious to anyone that there were serious violations of
constitutional law. Aside from such exceptions, the Court was
evidently unwilling to enforce constitutional norms against the
wishes of the government.
Recent examples of judicial intervention contrast nicely with
such lethargy in the past. In Takase v. Japan," decided in 2005,
the Supreme Court held that Public Offices Election Law
precluding Japanese citizens residing abroad from voting in
national elections was inconsistent with the constitutional
guarantee of voting rights. Applying the strict scrutiny standard
for the very first time, the Court made an exacting inquiry into
possible justifications for the exclusion and notes that, due to the
advancement in communication technology on a global scale,
qualified voters residing in all parts of the world can now easily
familiarize themselves with the information about legislative
candidates via the Internet. Accordingly, it has held that the
" Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962,

16 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI

HANREISHO [KEISHO] 1593.

* Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 20, 1972, 26 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHO [KEISHO] 631.
I
Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, 27 SAIKO SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHC [KEISHO] 265. The stipulated punishment was much more severe than

that for ordinary homicide, which was imprisonment for not less than three years.
The Court held that such a large difference was not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest and was thus in violation of the Equality Clause. See
NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1 (Japan) (GOVT
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/
c01.html. The Public Prosecutors Office thereafter stopped using the nullified
provision, instead opting to indict all patricide offenders for ordinary homicide.
However, due to fierce opposition from conservative quarters, the legislature did not
remove the unconstitutional provision from the Criminal Code until 1995, when the
coalition government led by Socialists finally deleted it.
MINJI
6 Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, 59 SAIKO SAIBANSHO
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 2087. The law was found to be simultaneously in violation of
Article 15, Paragraphs 1 (the right to choose public officials) and 3 (universal adult
suffrage), Article 43, Paragraph 1 (the Diet's character as the representative of all
the people), and the proviso to Article 44 (prohibition of discrimination as to the
qualifications of electors of members of the Diet). See id.
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need for well-informed decisions, cited by the Ministry of Justice
as the reason for exclusion, cannot be a compelling government
interest justifying the disenfranchisement of Japanese citizens
living abroad. The number of such citizens is currently more
By ensuring that their voting rights are
than 1.1 million.
protected, the Court has included into the political process a
diverse and important group of voters: those who have contacts
with people of different nationalities and cultures on a daily
basis.'
Even more significant is Anonymous v. Japan,"8 rendered in
2008. In this case, the Supreme Court declared a provision in the
Nationality Act 0 unconstitutional under the Equality Clause."
The Japanese Nationality Act is an interesting piece of
legislation in that, although technically part of public law,
follows the jus sanguinis principle characteristic of continental
legal systems, rather than the Anglo-American jus soli principle,
as to attribution of nationality at birth. There was a problem,
however, because of its narrow wording: "although an
illegitimate child acquire [d] Japanese nationality by birth ipso
facto when its mother [was] a Japanese national, it [did] not do
so when only its father [was] a Japanese national unless the
father recognize[d] the child before its birth."9 Explaining that
nationality must be determined at the time of birth, the Ministry
of Justice denied Japanese nationality to children born out of
wedlock to non-Japanese mothers and Japanese fathers but
See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT OF STATISTICS ON
NATIONALS OVERSEAS (2009), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/toko/tokei/hojin/10/pdfs/l.pdf. The latest available figure is 1,131,807,
calculated in October 2009. The number of Japanese people in Iraq is not publicly
disclosed for security reasons and therefore not included here. Id.
' The legislature amended the Public Offices Election Law the following year to
make sure that voters living outside of Japan could cast their ballots, either by mail
or at diplomatic and consular offices abroad. See Law No. 62 of 2006.
9 Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June. 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) 135, 62 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHo [MINSHO] 6 (Japan), available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-Tsu-.No.. 135-111255.html.
"o[Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950.
91 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1 (Japan) (GOV'T
PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/eletc/c01.
html.
9 See Hosokawa Kiyoshi, Japanese Nationality in InternationalPerspective, in
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 177, 191 (Ko Swan
Sik ed., 1990).
8

JAPANESE

" Id. at 192.
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acknowledged by the fathers after they were born. The only way
for them to acquire nationality was through legitimation by
subsequent marriage of the parents-which was not always
available and in any event beyond the control of the children
themselves. Many of these children's mothers were Philippine
and other Asian women, as was the case with the plaintiffs.
In holding that such discriminatory treatment is no longer
allowed, the Japanese Supreme Court placed much emphasis on
the rapid progress of globalization, specifically referring to the
increase in the number of international marriages and
cohabitations in Japan. The majority pointed out that no fault
could be attributed to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, it struck down
the statutory scheme as not rationally related, to the asserted
government interest of limiting nationality to those with a strong
connection with Japan. Following Anonymous, the legislature
quickly amended the relevant provisions and the new Nationality
Act" came into force in 2009. An illegitimate child like the
plaintiffs in Anonymous can now acquire Japanese nationality
ipso jure by simply filing with the Minister of Justice, stating
that his or her father is a Japanese national. The Minister of
Justice may make inquiries but has no discretion to reject a valid
application.
Kikuya, as well as Anzai in hindsight, is a momentous
decision that needs to be understood in the context of these latest
developments in Japanese constitutional law. As discussed in
Part II, the Supreme Court analyzed the case in a way quite
different from the previous line of cases and applied Article 89,
instead of Paragraph 3 of Article 20. In doing so, the Court
subtly heightened the constitutional threshold the government
Under Kikuya, the purpose and effect of
must satisfy.
governmental action are no longer decisive, particularly when
activities conducted on public property are patently religious in
nature. This landmark Supreme Court decision, which makes it
easier for a citizen to challenge governmental action, is a
reminder to public officials across Japan that they are required
to live up to the constitutional commitment to separation of
church and state-a commitment that is becoming increasingly
important as the society matures and consideration for
minorities and neighboring countries emerges as a new
" [Nationality Act], Law No. 88 of 2008.

2011]

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN JAPAN

469

challenge. The Court's special attention to the separation of
church and state seems deliberate and especially appropriate in
light of the fact that conservative Japanese politicians' homage to
the Yasukuni Shrine has frequently drawn harsh criticism from
surrounding nations in recent years.
With a series of innovative, outward-looking decisions
embodying the spirit of the Preamble to the Constitution of
Japan, the Japanese Supreme Court has made clear its intention
to intervene when it is necessary to enforce constitutional norms
against the government. The issues dealt with in cases decided
after around 1990 are more substantive than those identified in
earlier cases in terms of their constitutional significance: voting
rights, prohibition on discrimination based on immutable
characteristics, and the separation of church and state, which is
meant to solidify the protection of religious liberty, according to
Kikuya.

Judicial activism in enforcing individual rights and liberties
is referred to as a "worldwide movement"95 these days. Friedman
points out that "the trend toward stronger and more active
courts" is found on all continents including Asia. Japan is
starting to join this international trend, although, admittedly,
the number of powerful decisions like Kikuya is still low. It is
heartening that the Japanese Supreme Court seems to be
concentrating its efforts on areas that are particularly important
from the perspective of redeeming the debt of imperialism and
strengthening Japan's ties with its neighbors, such as the
separation of church and state. The full picture of Kikuya's
effects remains to be seen; one of the matters that should be
looked into in the future will be judicial philosophy and voting
patterns of seven new Justices97 appointed by the Hatoyama and

95 FRIEDMAN, supra note 72.
98 Id.

* None of these Justices took office in time for participation in the consideration
of the Kikuya case.
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Kan cabinets consisting mostly of Democrats," whose promise in
the election of 2009 was to break with the old-style politics of the
pro-Shinto LDP.9

" Yukio Hatoyama, the former leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, was
Prime Minister of Japan from September 2009 to June 2010. Profile: Yukio
Hatoyama, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8168838.stm(last
updated June 2, 2010, 7:28). He was succeeded by Naoto Kan in both capacities.
Naoto Kan, N.Y. TIMES, http//topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/
naoto-kan/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2011). By coincidence five Supreme
Court Justices retired because of their age and two Justices passed away in office
between December 2009 and November 2010, making 2010 a year with an unusually
high number of appointments of Justices. Cf Saibansho Ho [Judiciary Act], Law No.
59 of 1947, art. 50 (Justices hold tenure until the age of mandatory retirement, age
70).
* "One is struck by the intimate connections between the LDP and the SAS ....
SAS debating club members are all LDP." Breen, supra note 51, at 79. SAS stands
for the "Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership,".the political wing of the Shinto
establishment founded in 1969. See id. at 74.
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APPENDIX:
NUMBER OF JAPANESE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT
INVALIDATED STATUTORY PROVISIONS OR GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIONS
1990s
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2000s
3

1970s
3

1980s
2

Supreme

(Equality

Court
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(Right
to Sue
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That

Liberty

Liberty
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11

D)

1;
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Numberof

1940s
0

1950s
0

1960s
0

2010
0

Right l,
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___________________1)

Numberof

1.
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2'

0

1

0

1

Supreme
Court

(Separation
ofChurch

(Separation
of Church

Decisions

and State)

and State)

That
Invalidated
Governmental
Actions

Total

1

3

4

5

2

1

3

1

' Most of the cases in these cells were about gross infringements of
constitutional rights of suspects, defendants, or third parties in criminal
proceedings, except that two of them involved a technical issue of whether GHQ
directives and regulations remained in force after the San Francisco Peace Treaty
had taken effect, and one was about the permissibility of a judge-mandated
settlement in an eviction case.
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